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Abstract  –According  to  both  the  US  Geological  Survey 
and the World Bank, $280 billion dollars could have been 
saved if $40 billion dollars had been invested in disaster 
prevention. Natural and human-made disasters that have 
occurred over the last few years show that there is a gap in 
disaster prevention caused by the interconnected nature of 
risks,  which  cannot  be  foreseen  with  current  risk 
management  methods.  In  this  paper  we  point  out  how 
disaster management could benefit from a SoS approach in 
emergency response and preparedness strategies.  Using 
recent disasters as case studies, we identify some keys to 
success in managing a SoS in preparation, during and in 
the aftermath of a disaster. In particular, we discuss the 
idea of the interconnectedness of risks in independent and 
interdependent systems and the application of Boardman 
and  Sauser’s  concept  of  “creative  disobedience”,  which 
are fundamental for goal achievement of systems belonging 
to a SoS. 
Keywords: SoS dynamics, disaster management. 
 
1  Introduction 
In  many  countries,  risks  related  to  disasters  are 
managed  following  a  paradigm  of  traditional  risk 
management. This is based on a cycle in which risk 
identification,  risk  evaluation,  risk  mitigation  and 
policy adjustment [1, 2] are the four steps which are 
followed  in  a  logic  of  continuous  improvement 
towards the evolving system conditions. The corollary 
of this approach is that only identified risks can be 
managed  and  embedded  into  a  policy.  However, 
disasters  are  part  of  complex  systems  involving  a 
network  of  risks,  rather  than  linear  causal 
relationships  [3].  The  difference  between  
complicated and complex  risks can be inferred  [4] 
from  Snowden  and  Boone‟s  distinction  between 
„complicated and complex cognitive domains‟ [5]. In 
a  risk  network,  there  are  some  risks  which  can  be 
identified  and  some  which  stay  unforeseen.  The 
former are „complicated‟ as they can be ascertained a 
priori.  The  latter  are  „complex‟  as  they  involve  a 
higher  degree  of  uncertainty  which  involves  the 
cause-effect relationship to stay unknown until after 
the risk occurrence [6]. This approach is particularly 
effective in the case of linear causal relationships, i.e. 
when an identified cause is connected to one or more 
identified  effects.  However,  there  are  at  least  two 
problems  with  this  approach:  first  the  way  lessons 
learned  are  currently  managed  does  not  work  as 
expected [7], which means that even after repeating 
the risk management cycle, some risks are left out and 
hence not managed. Second, a deterministic approach 
for  risk  assessment  [8],  does  not  consider  the 
possibility  of  unforeseen  risks  due  for  instance  to 
factors like climate change.  
The  fact  that  we  need  to  come  up  with  new 
approaches to face a complexity which includes risks 
that  we  cannot  necessarily  foresee  has  been 
recognised by many [3, 4, 9, 10]. Particularly, Boteler 
[11]  highlights  the  need  for  holistic  approaches  in 
disaster  management.  Leveson  [7]  points  out  that 
safety  is  an  attribute  which  applies  to  the  whole 
system  and  not  just  to  the  individual  components.  
Salmon [12] suggests that a disaster can be considered 
as a system which cannot be broken down easily into 
its components as it needs to be analysed as a whole.   
From an organisational point of view, the system of a 
disaster  involves  several  organisations,  institutions 
and agencies such as the Red Cross, government, fire 
services  and  police.  These  are  all  systems  in  an 
evolving  system  of  systems  (SoS),  which  is  the 
disaster  context  itself,  immersed  in  ever-changing 
environmental  and  contextual  conditions.  The 
coordination of different agencies is often organised 
hierarchically and it can be challenging, particularly 
in the occurrence of an unexpected disaster. Problems 
can  arise  in areas  such as  communication,  situation 
awareness and cultural issues [13]. Differences in the 
goal achievement criteria of each organisation can be 
an obstacle as well.  For this reason, it is important 
that each agency is aware of the action scope of the 
others.  Also  it  should  be  discussed  previous  to  a disaster which agency is going to take the lead in the 
case  of  an  emergency  [13].  In  the  context  of  a 
disaster, agencies are expected to act on the basis of 
regulations  and  policies  following  command-control 
logics.  In  this  paper,  however,  we  argue  that  these 
formal rules correspond to an appropriate response to 
„complicated risks‟, but that they are less valuable in 
the context of complex risks. 
2  Complexity in recent disasters 
The  US  Geological  Survey  and  the  World  Bank 
estimated  that $280  billion  dollars  could  have  been 
saved  if  $40  billion  dollars  had  been  invested  in 
natural  disaster  prevention  worldwide  [Benson  and 
Clay 2003 in 14]. Natural and human-made disasters 
have  dominated  global  media  reporting  in  recent 
times.  The  9/11  terrorist  attack,  2004  tsunami  near 
Sumatra, Victorian bushfires in Australia, earthquake 
in  New  Zealand,  flooding  in  New  Orleans  and 
earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster in Japan are 
just  some  of  the  catastrophic  events  which  have 
occurred  over  the  past  few  years.  The  number  of 
natural disasters are believed to be increasing because 
of climate change [15, 16], but human mistakes are 
exacerbating their effects. For example, pre-existing 
management issues contributed worsening the nuclear 
disaster  in  Japan  and  flooding  consequences  in 
Queensland both in 2011 [17]. So what can entities 
such  as  government  authorities  or  crisis  monitoring 
agencies really do to prevent death, destruction, loss, 
mental  illness  and  long-term  effects  in  the  world? 
Recent disasters have shown a lack of efficiency in 
managing  situations  before  they  turn  into  disasters. 
For example, in 2005 despite the adequate available 
information,  the  public  officials  of  New  Orleans 
failed  to  evacuate  the  population  before  flooding 
caused a landfall. By then the inhabitants did not have 
any way to escape and as a consequence hundreds of 
people lost their lives [18].  
In a time where information flows very quickly from 
one  side  of  the  earth  to  the  other,  people  are 
increasingly critical of how disasters are managed and 
concerned with what can be done to prevent critical 
situations  from  turning  into  crises.  Traditional  risk 
management has  developed  preparedness  brochures, 
simulations  and  other  types  of  awareness  programs 
(e.g.  Red  Cross,  Country  Fire  Services,  US 
Geological Survey). Most of these programs focus on 
specific risks and do not take into consideration the 
multi-causality of risks [19]. Many risk programs are 
also organized around manuals, rules and laws which 
are assumed to be followed in the case of a disaster. 
In  reality,  however,  the  disasters  cited  above 
demonstrate that these measures are not followed by 
all parts of society, including the various institutional, 
corporate and demographic groupings. For instance, 
despite the existence  of regulations in Japan, Prime 
Minister  Kan  delayed  disclosing  important 
information about the radioactivity of the Fukushima 
power plant, causing a part of the population to move 
into  the  radioactive  wake  [20].  Costa  Crociere,  the 
company which owns the cruise ship which crashed in 
Italian  waters  earlier  this  year,  was  aware  of  the 
illegal sail-past practice, but it did not do anything to 
stop captains from continuing doing it [21].  
  While the last examples seem to suggest simply that  
the law should have been applied to avoid potential 
disasters,  there  are  other  situations  where  the  ideal 
behaviour or response is not as easy to identify.  For 
example,  after  the  cyclone  in  1977,  many  Indian 
laborers  moved  from  rural  Southern  Indian  to  the 
coast,  which was more likely to  be hit by disasters  
[22]. This raises a number of difficult questions for 
risk managers.  It seems straight forward that  these 
people should not move to the coast as it will be more 
dangerous  when  the  next  natural  disaster  occurs. 
However,  the  correlation  between  disasters  and 
poverty [14] suggests that they might have moved to 
the coast to access  the minimal resources to live. In 
that case, „life preservation‟ has to form an additional 
goal of a SoS in the case of a disaster.  
  In  this  context,  the  efficiency  of  disaster 
management depends  on  awareness  of  the  SoS  risk 
interdependencies and prioritization. In other words, 
risks need to be contextualized in their network and 
managed,  taking  into  consideration  the  different 
patterns which can result as a consequence of a crisis. 
When the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull erupted 
in  2010,  the  authorities  used  the  precautionary 
principle  to  stop  most  of  the  air  traffic  after  the 
eruption. Although some airlines had verified the sky 
conditions and ascertained the absence of significant 
danger, they were not allowed to transport passengers 
for days, causing heavy economic losses. Eventually, 
authorities decided to reopen airports without having 
any more data about ash in the sky than when they 
decided  to  close  them  [3].  Like  in  the  case  of  the 
Eyjafjallajökull,  many  institutions  refuse  to  manage 
complex risks as they  do not think to be able to cope 
with the complexity and uncertainty involved [3, 19]. 
The  reason  for  this  is  because  contingent  programs 
are based on the identification and analysis of specific 
known  risks,  whereas  high  uncertainty  requires  the 
identification and analysis of different alternative risk 
patterns  [19].  For  this  reason,  we  use  the  lens  of 
Complex  Risk  Management  to  focus  on  the 
management  of  foreseeable  and  unforeseeable  risks 
(also  called  „unknown  unknowns‟  or  „unk  unks‟  in 
aerospace  engineering  [3])  and  their  effects  in  a 
disaster. 
   3  A  SoS  during  the  Fukushima 
Daiichi disaster 
Reports  on  the  Fukushima  Daiichi  disaster,  which 
have  been  published  since  [20,  23],  reveal  the 
structure  of  a  System  of  Systems  (SoS),  where  the 
interconnectedness  and  interactions  between  the 
systems and their environment made risks evolve and 
develop into a network of unanticipated causes and 
effects over a very short period of time. Despite the 
fact that earthquake and tsunamis are not uncommon 
in Japan (in fact they have much better anti-seismic 
buildings than in Italy), neither the government nor 
the  Nuclear  Safety  Commission  (NSC)  nor  the 
company at the centre of the nuclear disaster, Tokyo 
Electric Power Company (TEPCO) had put in place 
adequate measures of disaster prevention [20].    
  
 
Figure 1. A partial risk network of the Fukushima 
Daiichi disaster inferred from [20, 23]. 
 
In  Japan,  the  Nuclear  Safety  Commission  (NSC) 
oversees  the  Nuclear  and  Industrial  Safety  Agency 
(NISA).  NSC‟s  inadequate  regulations  impacted  on 
the  guidelines  that  NISA  imposed  on  TEPCO  [20]. 
So, for example, NSC‟s regulations did not take into 
consideration the possibility of electricity outages as it 
was judged that temporary blackouts would have been 
quickly  solved.  As  a result  of  poor  regulations and 
controls,  TEPCO  managed  the  disaster 
inappropriately, contributing to worsening the nuclear 
disaster  which  had  been  caused  by  the  tsunami 
following the initial quake [20, 23] (Figure 1).  Here 
we could assume that if more regulations had been put 
in  place,  then  the  disaster  would  have  had reduced 
dimensions.  However,  the  fact  that  appropriate 
regulations  were  available  at  an  international  level 
and that TEPCO for different reasons did not happen 
to abide by them should open a question about the 
effectiveness of international control and monitoring 
institutions. In this case, the decision not to abide by 
the  international  law  had  been  consciously  taken at 
the corporate and at the institutional level.  
 
Command-control  logic  failed  at  different  levels 
during  the  Fukushima  disaster.  When  the  disaster 
happened, the two most important people in TEPCO‟s 
top  management  were  away  on  holidays  or  on 
business travel. For different reasons, they were not 
able to go back immediately to Fukushima, causing a 
slowdown  in  decision-making  and  information 
sharing  between  the  government  and  TEPCO‟s 
management  [20].  The  nuclear  disaster  involved  a 
complexity that TEPCO was not prepared to face, to 
the point that the government had to call in external 
nuclear experts to help to manage the disaster [20]. 
However,  there  was  a  decisive  point  where  the 
hierarchical logic of decision-making was broken by a 
subordinate  who  would  not  have  normally  had  the 
authority  to  ignore  the  orders. In the  middle  of  the 
disaster,  the  situation  in  the  Daiichi  plant  was  still 
extremely uncertain and the decisions taken seemed to 
be distant from their operational impacts. The lack of 
adequate information and the misuse of the available 
data  put  the  decision-makers  in  a  difficult  position 
[20]. It was not clear which effect their decisions or 
the lack of decisions would have had on the whole 
system. So, at one of the most critical points of the 
crisis, a key decision about stopping or continuing the 
water injections to reduce the temperature of Unit 1 
could not be taken.  
Tensions  between  the  government  and  TEPCO  top 
management and then between the latter and the site 
management, made the decision even more complex.  
At  some  point  the  government  authorized  the 
injections,  while  the  liaison  of  the  company  to  the 
government said that they had to be stopped until a 
strategy  to  manage  the  crisis  had  been  decided.  
However,  the  Fukushima  Daiichi  site  management 
was  convinced  of  the  importance  of  continuing  the 
water  injections.  In  fact,  during  a  teleconference, 
Fukushima  Daiichi  Director  Yoshida  decided  to 
formally accept the orders to stop the water injections, 
but secretly told his staff in charge of this operation to 
continue the water injections. By doing this, he helped 
the  company  to  manage  the  conflict  with  the 
government,  whilst  importantly  preventing  the 
worsening of the nuclear crisis [20].  
This is an example of what Boardman and Sauser call 
„creative  disobedience‟  [24]  which  is,  and  must  be, 
implicit in paradoxical situations such as crises. The 
idea  is  that  in  complex  systems  where  available 
information is often not available at every level of the 
hierarchy, subordinates need to understand the main 
goal of their mission to the extent that they are able to 
act  independently  of  orders  for  the  highest  of  the 
system goals. In the case of Fukushima, Yoshida was 










regulationsthan the other people who were in a position of taking 
a  decision.  The  complexity  of  this  scenario  raises 
some  very  interesting  questions  about  the  SoS 
dynamics during the disaster.     
4  Why systems thinking in the crisis 
In the midst of the uncertainty, Yoshida had a good 
intuition, but what if things had gone differently? The 
case of the Japanese crisis is just an example. There 
are  others  in  which  extreme  uncertainty  pushed 
people  to  make  decisions  against  the  manual. 
However,  in  the  end  the  resulting  effects  of  the 
disaster were interpreted by authorities as a result of 
the operators‟ misbehavior.  
Much legislation is built around the responsibility of 
individuals managing the disaster. If on the one hand, 
this  gives  a  decision-making  framework  to  the 
responsible authorities, on the other it can push these 
to  take  decisions  away  from  an  informed  common 
sense.  This  effect  is  caused  by  a  hierarchical  and 
command-control way of thinking which is based on 
the  assumption  that  situations,  risks,  projects, 
disasters,  systems  can  be  broken  down  into 
manageable entities. By doing this, the sense of the 
effects on the overall system is lost.  
As Gilpin and Murphy note [19], it is important to 
understand to what extent the whole can be reduced 
before we start losing essential information about the 
system.  Current  regulations  are  very  likely  to  have 
unforeseen  negative  effects  [25]  if  a  global 
perspective  is  not  taken.  There  is  a  big  limitation, 
though. Thinking in terms of system of systems about 
a  disaster  can  be  overwhelming,  especially  when  a 
generalization is attempted. In fact, some authors state 
that systems theory is not adequate for a crisis as it 
would  involve  the  system  being  subject  to 
“rationalism and control” [19] which, as our examples 
show, might not be enough to protect a system from a 
crisis. This is true when the SoS is considered with a 
command-control lens, i.e. a hierarchical one. Indeed, 
it is not realistic to have a central control for a SoS in 
a  disaster  because  each  organization  and  institution 
has a separate set of goals, i.e. it is independent and 
obeys the organisation‟s peculiar hierarchy.  
There is an underlying risk network in every SoS in 
which  risks  have  an  impact  beyond  the  individual 
systems  which  have  triggered  the  risk  occurrence 
[26]. For example, the nuclear disaster in Japan has 
had consequences on near countries (outgoing arrows 
in Figure 2). This raises a number of questions about 
the  management  of  global  risks  as  highlighted  by 
Beck [26]  who talks about „world risk societies‟ to 
indicate those communities which share risks beyond 
political borders. Gaps and overlaps [27] emerge from 
the comparison between risk networks of a disaster 
and the organisational structure of different agencies 
dealing with disasters.   
 
Figure 2. Stylized risk network for a disaster. 
If we superimpose risk domains of a disaster on the 
organisational  structure  of  the  agencies  managing 
disasters,  we  get  two  pictures  which  do  not  appear 
complementary (Figure 3). Big circles represent risk 
domains,  whereas  small  circles  with  a  stylized 
organisation  chart  in  the  middle  correspond  to 
organisations managing disasters. We assume that all 
organisations,  institutions,  communities,  etc.  belong 
to a system of systems.   
 
Figure 3. Example of risk domains and hierarchical 
systems in a SoS configuration. 
That organisations need to work together to manage a 
disaster is clear to the most. However, what we are 
saying  here  is  that  they  need  to  do  it  in  a  more 
integrated  way,  as  has  been  acknowledged  also  by 
some humanitarian organisations [28]. Being aware of 
the  ontology  of  complexity  as  explained  at  the 
beginning of this paper and acknowledging the  fact 
that organisations operate in a system of system can 
support organisations in working towards a new way 
of integrated cooperation. For example, we know that 
in complex projects, the probability of success can be 
increased by getting team members to share goals and 
values [3]. Then, a SoS approach is a viable method 
when the goals of a SoS have been agreed in advance within different organisations and when it is possible 
to have an inductive approach to problems together 
with  a  deductive  one,  i.e.  command-control.  This 
involves  individual  organizations  and  individual 
members having the maturity and autonomy to allow 
them  to  take  decisions  away  from  predefined 
frameworks, but still appreciating and understanding 
the long-term goal of the underlying organization.  
5  Conclusion 
This paper suggests that current disaster management 
frameworks should be changed into paradigms which 
involve a SoS vision of situations potentially turning 
into  disasters.  Instead  of  using  command-control 
management  techniques,  the  perspective  should  be 
also  inductive  so  that  goals  can  be  negotiated  and 
organizations  can  achieve  a  higher  degree  of 
effectiveness  in  disaster  SoSs.  Such  an  approach 
would also allow a better integration of all functions 
planning and operating during a disaster.  
Moreover,  a  global  perspective  supported  by 
complexity science and systems theory shall focus on 
hazards taken in their risk network context. We need 
to  be  aware  of  global  risks  and  have  an  approach 
which aims to mitigate some risks and to accept the 
uncertainty  that  others  involve.  As  the  number  of 
disasters  increases  and  technology  development 
induces  incalculable  system  evolutions  [29]  (e.g. 
nuclear disasters), we need to change our way to think 
about  disasters.  We  need  to  collaborate  with  other 
„risk societies‟, discuss priorities and goals and decide 
together which risks to manage. Finally, we need to 
get used to the fact that we cannot control everything 
and  that  disasters  may  happen.  This  will  not 
necessarily mean that we failed. 
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